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OUT OF REACH: PROTECTING PARENTAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FROM 
CLAWBACK IN BANKRUPTCY 
ABSTRACT 
Parental contributions to higher education have become commonplace. 
However, courts are divided on how contributions by parents towards the 
college education of their children should be treated when those parents file 
for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code grants trustees avoidance powers under 
§ 548 to recover transfers made by a debtor up to two years before the petition 
date if those transfers are actually or constructively fraudulent. Trustees are 
attempting to use these avoidance powers to “clawback” payments made to 
colleges and universities by debtors for the education of their children. Factors 
including societal expectations, financial aid calculations, emotional benefits, 
and economics have created varying opinions on whether these contributions 
constitute constructive fraud under § 548. 
This disagreement has not gone unnoticed. In 2015, a bill was introduced 
in the House of Representatives that seeks to create an exception to trustee 
avoidance power for all parental tuition payments: the Protecting All College 
Tuition (PACT) Act. However, the PACT will not effectively protect 
educational expenditures from trustee avoidance powers because it fails to 
explicitly preempt state bankruptcy laws. 
Parental contributions to higher education are similar to charitable 
donations, a category of transfers that has been protected from trustee 
avoidance powers since the passage of the Religious Liberty and Charitable 
Donation Protection Act (RLCDPA) of 1998. Using the RLCDPA as a guide, 
this Comment will propose amendments to the Code to protect payments to 
institutions of higher education by parent debtors on behalf of their children. 
With simple additions to § 544 and § 548, federal lawmakers can advance the 
public’s interest in higher education, protect creditors, and limit the need for 
litigation around the subject.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As the cost of college continues to rise, parents are contributing more 
financially to the higher education of their children.1 When a parent files for 
bankruptcy, these contributions become subject to review.2 In recent years, 
some bankruptcy trustees have tried to recover (“clawback”) payments made to 
colleges and universities by parent debtors on behalf of their adult children.3 
The trustees argue that, where a child is eighteen or older, these funds should 
be used to satisfy the parent debtor’s own growing debts.4 As of 2015, at least 
twenty-five colleges had been asked to return money as fraudulent transfers 
and over a dozen had complied.5 According to consumer bankruptcy experts, 
this trend is expected to rise.6 
Trustees are responsible for examining the financial history of a debtor in 
bankruptcy and, where possible, recovering funds the debtor transferred prior 
to filing for redistribution to creditors.7 Where a trustee finds that a debtor did 
not receive “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for a transfer of the 
debtor’s assets, the trustee can sue to recover that property as a constructively 
fraudulent transfer.8 Most commonly, trustees look for property or cash the 
debtor gave to family members or friends.9 But when a parent pays tuition to a 
college or university for his or her child, some trustees have argued that it is 
not the parent who receives value in return, but the child.10 It is under this 
argument that trustees look to recover those funds.11  
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code) does not define reasonably equivalent 
value, but courts and commentators agree that debtors must receive some sort 
of economic benefit in exchange for a transfer of their assets before reasonably 
 
 1 See SALLIE MAE, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 7–9 (2015), http://news.salliemae.com/files/ 
doc_library/file/HowAmericaPaysforCollege2014FNL.pdf.; see also Katy Stech, Bill Proposes Ban on Tuition 
Clawbacks in Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J.: BANKRUPTCY BEAT (May 12, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
bankruptcy/2015/05/12/bill-proposes-ban-on-tuition-clawbacks-in-bankruptcy. 
 2 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 3 Stech, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 17–18 (3d ed. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics. 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 9 Stech, supra note 1. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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equivalent value can be found.12 Even still, some courts have effectively 
ignored the requirement of reasonably equivalent value in their analysis and 
instead based their decisions to protect tuition payments from clawback on 
public policy grounds.13 
The courts are not the only ones that think trustees should not be able to 
clawback tuition from universities.14 In 2015, federal lawmakers introduced the 
Protecting All College Tuition (PACT) Act to protect tuition payments from 
trustees.15 The PACT Act addresses the treatment of tuition payments by 
parent debtors in bankruptcy and seeks to protect such payments from 
clawback under § 548 of the Code.16 However, the bill stalled after it was 
introduced in the House of Representatives.17 This lack of activity coupled 
with several drafting issues suggest that the PACT Act, as it is written, is not 
the solution to the disagreement on how educational expenditures should be 
treated in bankruptcy.18 That does not mean the goal of that legislation is 
unfounded, though. Protecting tuition payments from clawback is important for 
three policy reasons: (1) parental income impacts student financial aid, (2) 
schools receive payments from parents in good faith, and (3) society expects 
parents to help their children pay for college.  
This Comment will argue that § 544 and § 548 of the Code should be 
amended to protect parental payments to colleges and universities. It will 
suggest protection for such payments that equate to fifteen percent or less of 
the parent debtor’s income and those that exceed fifteen percent where a 
consistent practice can be shown. This fifteen percent threshold is similar to 
the protection the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act 
(RLCDPA) created for charitable donations.19 RLCDPA, enacted in 1998, will 
serve as a helpful starting point.20 But this Comment will show that effective 
legislation must go a few steps further and address some of the questions left 
 
 12 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see, e.g., Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R. 
444, 444 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (In re Wilkinson), 196 F. App’x 337, 341 
(6th Cir. 2006). 
 13 See, e.g., Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2010); In re 
Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457–58. 
 14 See Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id.; Elizabeth Stephens, PACT Will Not Prevent Trustees from Attempting to Claw Back College 
Tuition Payments, 35-2 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 16, 17 (2016). 
 19 See generally Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
183, § 3, 112 Stat. 517 (1998). 
 20 Id. 
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unanswered by RLCDPA.21 By amending § 544 and 548 to protect payments 
to colleges and universities where specific criteria are met, Congress can 
protect both the ability of parents to contribute to their children’s higher 
education and the interest of creditors in preventing debtor fraud. 
I. BACKGROUND 
When an individual files for chapter 7 bankruptcy, the individual seeks to 
liquidate his nonexempt22 property in exchange for a discharge of his debts.23 
After a debtor files a petition with the bankruptcy court, a chapter 7 trustee is 
appointed to administer the debtor’s estate and facilitate the liquidation of the 
debtor’s nonexempt assets.24 The trustee seeks to maximize the amount 
received by the debtor’s unsecured creditors, utilizing the powers granted by 
the Code.25 
One of these powers is avoidance power, or the power to clawback 
transfers of property made by a debtor in the two years preceding the 
bankruptcy filing if the transfers are fraudulent.26 Fraudulent transfers include 
both those that are actually fraudulent and those that are constructively 
fraudulent.27 Deciding if a debtor received reasonably equivalent value for a 
transfer is an important step in identifying constructively fraudulent transfers.28 
Unfortunately, the Code does not define reasonably equivalent value, so the 
job of interpreting the concept has fallen to the courts.29 This task has proven 
to be particularly challenging where the value, if any, a debtor receives in 
exchange for a transfer of his property is indirect or intangible.30 A scenario in 
which this challenge commonly arises is when a debtor has contributed 
financially to his children’s higher education in the two years preceding the 
 
 21 See generally id. 
 22 Chapter 7 debtors may keep some of their property that is exempt under federal or state bankruptcy 
law. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012). 
 23 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 7, at 18–20. 
 24 Id. at 17–18. 
 25 See id. 
 26 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
 29 See id.; see, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 455–57; 
Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687, 701–02 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013); DeGiacomo v. Sacred 
Heart Univ. (In re Palladino), 556 B.R. 10, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016). 
 30 See, e.g., Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, 
Inc.), 680 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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bankruptcy filing.31 So far, courts disagree about whether such payments 
constitute constructive fraud.32 This Section will further explain § 548 and 
trustee avoidance powers. Then it will seek to better understand the meaning of 
reasonably equivalent value. Finally, it will introduce four key cases that 
demonstrate the variety of approaches courts have taken in analyzing parental 
contributions to higher education under § 548. 
A. Section 548 – Fraudulent Transfers 
Section 548 of the Code grants the bankruptcy trustees avoidance powers.33 
In other words, § 548 grants trustees the ability to clawback transfers made 
prior to bankruptcy if such transfers are found to be fraudulent.34 The section 
serves to ensure a debtor’s assets are distributed in a way that is in the best 
interest of all creditors.35 
Provisions like this have a deep history in bankruptcy law. The history of 
this section dates back to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth which was passed by the 
English parliament in 1571.36 The Statute sought to address a practice by 
debtors of transferring their assets to friends or family to obstruct attempts by 
creditors to collect on their claims.37 Debtors waited until their creditors gave 
up on recovering their claims and then retook ownership of the property they 
had transferred.38 These actions by the debtor were fraudulent because they 
depleted the debtor’s estate without receiving anything of similar value in 
exchange that could be used to satisfy the claims of his creditors.39  
Today, trustees can avoid transfers made by the debtor up to two years 
before the filing date of the bankruptcy petition.40 Section 548(a)(1) provides: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in 
property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was made 
 
 31 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 455–57; In re 
Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 14–15. 
 32 Compare In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, and In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458, with In re 
Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711, and In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 14–15. 
 33 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 177–78 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138–39. 
 36 Mellon Bank N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 643–44 (3d Cir. 1991). See generally 11 
U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 37 Mellon Bank N.A., 945 F.2d at 643. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012). 
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or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily— 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or 
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, indebted; or 
(B) 
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such 
transfer or obligation; . . . .41 
This section allows trustees to avoid transfers if they are either actually 
fraudulent or constructively fraudulent.42 Actually fraudulent transfers, 
reachable by trustees under § 548(a)(1)(A), are those that are made “with 
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” a creditor.43 Under § 548(a)(1)(B), 
trustees can also avoid transfers that were not intended to be fraudulent if the 
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent when the transfer was made and 
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”44 These 
transfers are referred to as constructively fraudulent.45  
It is easy to identify constructive fraud when a transfer is made for no 
consideration.46 However, it becomes less clear if a transfer constitutes 
constructive fraud when a debtor receives something of value in exchange for 
his property, but there is a question of whether the value received was 
“reasonably equivalent.”47 Even more challenging are situations in which a 
debtor received some indirect or intangible benefit in exchange for the transfer 
of his property.48  
B. What is Reasonably Equivalent Value?  
A key consideration in analyzing potentially fraudulent transfers under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B) is whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value in 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 44 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B); see Trey Monsour, Understanding Fraudulent Transfers and Ensuing Litigation, 
LAW 360 (July 2, 2014), http://law360.com/articles/553894/understanding-fraudulent-transfers-and-ensuing-
litigation. 
 45 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 46 Monsour, supra note 44. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See, e.g., In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301. 
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the exchange.49 That the debtor receives “less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange” is a fundamental feature of a constructively fraudulent 
transfer, but deciding whether reasonably equivalent value has been received is 
probably the most difficult task in a fraudulent transfer analysis.50 
In § 548(d)(2)(A), the Code says value is: “property or satisfaction or 
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but [value] does not 
include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative 
of the debtor.”51 The Code does not define reasonably equivalent value, 
however, and courts do not agree on how the term should be interpreted.52 In 
fact, bankruptcy courts have acknowledged that no bright line rule exists to 
determine if reasonably equivalent value is received.53  
Bankruptcy courts have said that the first step in deciding if a transferor 
receives reasonably equivalent value is to decide if any value was received at 
all.54 They have also long acknowledged that fair consideration may be 
received in the form of an indirect benefit.55 The court in Rubin v. 
Manufacturers Trust Co., first explained what has come to be known as the 
indirect benefit rule: 
[A] debtor may sometimes receive “fair” consideration even though 
the consideration given for his property or obligation goes initially to 
a third person . . . . [T]he transaction’s benefit to the debtor need not 
be direct; it may come indirectly through benefit to a third person . . . 
If the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in 
the debtor’s hands, or if the giving of the consideration to the third 
person otherwise confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then 
the debtor’s net worth has been preserved, and [the statute] has been 
satisfied—provided, of course, that the value of the benefit received 
by the debtor approximates the value of the property or obligation he 
has given up.56 
 
 49 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 50 Jeffrey Baliban, Measuring Reasonably Equivalent Value, A.B.A. (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter2012-measuring-reasonble-value.html.; 
see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 51 11 U.S.C § 548(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
 52 See id.; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 53 In re Lindell, 334 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); see also Creditors’ Comm. Of Jumer’s 
Castle Lodge, Inc. v. Jumer (In re Jumer’s Castle Lodge, Inc.), 338 B.R. 244, 354 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
 54 In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 341; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 55 See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991–92 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
 56 Id. 
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In other words, an indirect benefit may be recognized, but the courts must still 
decide if the value of that benefit is reasonably equivalent to the value of the 
property exchanged.57 
The court in In re TOUSA, further clarified what is required to recognize 
an indirect benefit.58 In that case, the parent company, TOUSA, Inc., was a 
Florida home builder indebted to a collection of lenders, the Transeastern 
Lenders, as a result of its involvement in a joint venture, the Transeastern JV.59 
The joint venture went into default on its debt and litigation ensued among 
TOUSA, the Transeastern JV and the Transeastern Lenders.60 TOUSA 
eventually settled with the joint venture for $420 million and its subsidiaries 
were made to pledge assets to secure new loans for payment of the 
settlement.61 But most of these “Conveying Subsidiaries,” as they were called, 
had no liability in the joint venture debt.62  
TOUSA and many of its subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy within six 
months of obtaining the new loans and a suit was brought to recover the 
settlement funds for the conveying subsidiaries.63 The Official Committee 
of Unsecured Creditors, which brought the suit on behalf of the 
subsidiaries, argued that they did not receive reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the funds used to pay a settlement that was an obligation to 
the joint venture of TOUSA and not the subsidiaries.64 The bankruptcy 
court agreed, holding that the funds paid in the settlement were a fraudulent 
transfer because “the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer [and] . . . did not receive 
either ‘property’ or the ‘satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent 
debt of the debtor,’” among other reasons.65 Additionally, the bankruptcy 
court found that the defendants did not produce evidence of tangible and 
concrete indirect benefits or any value of such benefits that could be 
quantified with reasonable precision.66 
 
 57 See id. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 58 See In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 59 See In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 60 In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 61 In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 62 In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 63 In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 64 In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 65 3V Cap. Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 444 B.R. 
613, 650 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 66 In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 650; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
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The court listed three requirements that must be met for an indirect benefit 
to be recognized: (1) the debtor must receive the benefit, even if indirectly; (2) 
the value received must be in some kind of enforceable entitlement to tangible 
or intangible property; (3) the property must be received in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation.67 
The courts have suggested that the Code’s reference to property in the 
definition of value should be construed “in its broadest sense, including cash, 
all interests in property, such as liens, and every kind of consideration 
including promises to act or forbear to act.”68 The Supreme Court has advised 
that “the term property . . . does not exclude interests that are novel or 
contingent or where enjoyment must be postponed.”69 Value, for bankruptcy 
purposes, seems to be synonymous with economic value and “economic value 
connotes monetary value, even if it is not immediately recognized.”70 But the 
Code does not instruct on the valuation of such economic benefits.71 
As economist Jeffrey Baliban explained, “[w]hile it is certainly appropriate 
that valuation experts should leave matters of law to the court, they can help 
with matters of fact where quantifying value is concerned.”72 Section 548 
serves to preserve value for unsecured creditors.73 With this in mind, it seems 
equitable that the “valuation of property [or] benefits received in a transfer 
should be analyzed from the creditors’ point of view.”74 Some courts 
conducting these valuations have chosen to apply a strict mathematical formula 
based on fair market value to decide if reasonably equivalent value has been 
received.75 Fair market value is “the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant 
facts.”76 To qualify as reasonably equivalent value under the formula, 
 
 67 In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 641; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 68 In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 656; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 69 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 70 Baliban, supra note 50. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Cooper v. Ashley Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990); 
see also Durrett v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1980); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. 
Co., 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging, but refusing to follow Durrett’s mathematical 
formula); see also Baliban, supra note 50 (quoting In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466). 
 76 United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 559 (1973); see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
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consideration must be worth at least seventy percent of the fair market value.77 
Other courts have rejected “any fixed mathematical formula . . . and opt[ed] for 
the standard that ‘[r]easonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of 
each case,’ an important element of which is market value.”78 Under this 
standard, fair market value remains an important consideration, but case-by-
case adjudication is required.79 
The effect of an indirect benefit on a transferor’s cost of capital may also 
be relevant.80 Cost of capital is the “expected rate of return that the market 
participants require in order to attract funds to a particular investment.”81 Any 
transfers a debtor makes that improve “its ability to generate cash flow, make 
its cash flows more consistent, or avoid the loss of cash flow could be viewed 
to have favorable impact on its cost of capital.”82  
The court in Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (In re Wilkinson), shared 
Baliban’s view that a benefit, whether directly or indirectly received by a 
debtor, must be an “economic” one to be considered “value.”83 According to 
the Wilkinson court, “[t]he district court rightly stated that ‘the focus should be 
on the overall effect on the debtor’s net worth after the transfer.’”84 Other 
courts have expressed a similar idea in holding that “ethereal” or “emotional 
benefits” do not constitute value for purposes of § 548.85 The Wilkinson court 
held that, where an indirect benefit is alleged to be received, a debtor must 
demonstrate that the benefit is “concrete and quantifiable.”86  
The debtor also has the burden of actually quantifying the benefit.87 The 
court acknowledged that this burden “can be challenging in a case where the 
alleged benefit is goodwill, corporate synergy, a business opportunity, the 
continuation of a business relationship, or some other intangible benefit.”88 In 
 
 77 In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466; see Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203; Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426–
27; see also Baliban, supra note 50. 
 78 In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466–67 (quoting Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 79 Baliban, supra note 50. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. (citing SHANNON PRATT & ROGER GRABOWSKI, COST OF CAPITAL: APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
(4th ed. 2010)). 
 82 Baliban, supra note 50. 
 83 In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342. 
 84 Id. 
 85 E.g., Pereira v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Gonzalez), 342 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 86 In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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Wilkinson, the indirect benefit to the debtor resulted in a reduction to his 
debt.89 The court found this to be a “concrete and quantifiable” indirect 
benefit.90 Thus, in order to be considered value, and potentially reasonably 
equivalent value, an indirect benefit must be: “(1) an ‘economic’ benefit; (2) 
concrete; and (3) quantifiable.”91 
C. Court Application of Reasonably Equivalent Value Standard to 
Educational Expenditures 
When analyzing educational expenditures under § 548, the decision 
whether such payments constitute constructive fraud should turn on if the 
parent making the payment received reasonably equivalent value in exchange. 
Courts have been split on whether such payments should be protected from 
clawback by the trustee in bankruptcy.92 Many courts, especially those holding 
that these payments should be protected, have not focused their analyses 
strictly on determining if reasonably equivalent value was received.93 Rather, 
these courts have engaged in judicial activism and based their holdings on 
policy considerations, effectively creating an exception not provided for in the 
Code.94 
Four cases since 2010 illustrate the disagreement among bankruptcy judges 
on whether educational expenditures made on behalf of a debtor’s child in the 
two years preceding bankruptcy should be protected from the bankruptcy 
trustee.95 On one hand, the bankruptcy courts in Banner v. Lindsay (In re 
Lindsay) and Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard) concluded that such payments 
are constructively fraudulent and reachable by the trustee.96 On the other hand, 
the courts in Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick) and DeGiacomo v. Sacred 
Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino) found that the benefits parents receive are 
enough to warrant protection for these payments.97 As these cases will show, 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 
B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
 93 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 
B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 94 See, e.g., In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15–16. See generally 11 
U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 95 See In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 
687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
 96 In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444. 
 97 In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
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the courts are starkly divided on the proper treatment of these payments in 
bankruptcy.98 
1. Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay): Transfers Are Fraudulent When Fair 
Consideration Is Not Received 
In Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), the court held that transfers by the 
debtor were constructively fraudulent because fair consideration was not 
received.99 In this case, the chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid transfers made by 
the debtor to his wife, his son, and a college where his son was enrolled.100 The 
debtor had previously been sued by a co-owner of his business and two years 
later, after violating an injunction resulting from that lawsuit, was ordered to 
pay over a million dollars in damages to the co-owner.101 The debtor 
transferred personal assets, including stock, cash, and the title to a house to his 
wife.102 The debtor also sold personal property, including a car and a 
motorcycle, and used the proceeds to pay his son’s college tuition.103 Just a few 
months later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy.104 
The court emphasized that an important factor in determining a 
constructively fraudulent transfer is whether the conveyance was made with 
fair consideration.105 The court asserted that fair consideration requires three 
things: “1. the recipient either conveyed property in exchange or discharged an 
antecedent debt in exchange; 2. such exchange is the ‘fair equivalent of the 
property received;’ and 3. such exchange was made in good faith.”106 When 
deciding this issue, the court stated that “[t]he burden of proof shifts from the 
plaintiff to the defendant where the facts regarding the nature of the 
consideration are in the defendant’s control.”107 
According to the court, the debtor failed to satisfy his burden of proof and 
demonstrate fair consideration.108 The court concluded that the debtor had no 
 
 98 See In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 
687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
 99 In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *1–2. 
 100 Id. at *1–8. 
 101 Id. at *11. 
 102 Id. at *12. 
 103 Id. at *13. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at *14–15; see Ackerman v. Ventimiglia (In re Ventimiglia), 362 B.R. 71, 81–82 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 106 In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *16–17; see In re Ventimiglia, 362 B.R. at 81–84. 
 107 In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *19. 
 108 Id. at *1–2. 
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legal obligation to pay for his child’s college education.109 It also rejected the 
argument that the debtor has a “moral obligation” to fund his son’s college 
education.110 The court also relied on a recent ruling in which another 
bankruptcy court dismissed a chapter 7 case for substantial abuse when the 
debtor admitted he filed the case with the goal of better positioning himself to 
fund a college education for his children.111 The Lindsay court held that the 
$35,055 in proceeds transferred to the university as tuition for the debtor’s son 
constituted fraudulent transfers and ordered the debtor to turn this amount over 
to the trustee.112 
2. Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard): Indirect Benefits Can Constitute 
Reasonably Equivalent Value Only Where Economic, Concrete, and 
Quantifiable 
The court in Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard) acknowledged that indirect 
benefits can constitute reasonably equivalent value, but they must be 
economic, concrete, and quantifiable.113 Under this standard, the court 
concluded that tuition payments for a debtor’s child are avoidable in 
bankruptcy.114 The debtors in this case co-signed a $35,000 student loan with 
their eighteen year old son and deposited the funds into their bank account.115 
In the year preceding their bankruptcy filing, the debtors wrote a check to 
Marquette University totaling over $20,000 for their son’s undergraduate 
education.116 When the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the trustee sought to 
clawback these payments as both actually and constructively fraudulent under 
the Code and Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes.117 
The university argued that the proceeds of the student loan were held in 
trust by the debtors for their son.118 Pre-petition transfers of property held in 
trust for another are generally not avoidable as fraudulent transfers.119 The 
court rejected this contention, however, saying that the debtors “owned a one-
 
 109 Id. at *27. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. (citing In re Godios, 333 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 112 Id. at *28. 
 113 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342). 
 114 Id. at 460. 
 115 Id. at 447. 
 116 Id. at 460. 
 117 Id. at 447–48. 
 118 Id. at 447. 
 119 Id. at 450–51; see Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 849–52 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
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half interest in the funds” and that the funds had been “commingled with the 
debtor’s other funds.”120 The court supported this conclusion with “evidence 
that the debtors used the funds for their own purposes, including payment of 
property taxes on their home.”121 
The university also argued that the debtors received reasonably equivalent 
value for the payments “because the transfers enabled their son to attend and 
receive a college education at [the university].”122 The trustee, however, 
countered that any value received in exchange for the tuition payments made 
by the debtors was received by the debtors’ son, a third party.123 The university 
did not dispute a direct benefit to the debtors’ son, but claimed the debtors also 
received reasonably equivalent value: 
in the form of intangible benefits: (1) “their son received an 
education” which “bestowed peace of mind” on the Debtors that 
[their son] “will be afforded opportunities” in life that would not 
have come but for the education; and (2) Debtors “anticipated that 
they will not remain financially responsible” for [their son].124 
Looking to previous Sixth Circuit cases, the court cited the indirect benefit 
rule from Rubin and acknowledged that “[v]alue can be in the form of either a 
direct economic benefit or an indirect economic benefit.”125 The court applied 
the Wilkinson test that requires an indirect benefit be (1) an economic benefit, 
(2) concrete, and (3) quantifiable, before it can constitute reasonably 
equivalent value.126  
Though it conceded that a feeling of moral obligation is “understandable,” 
the court said that satisfying a moral obligation and receiving “peace of mind” 
that their son “will be afforded opportunities” is not an economic benefit to the 
debtors.127 The court found that speculative future relief from a need to 
financially support their son was unconvincing.128 Further, the court 
highlighted that the debtors had no legal obligation under Michigan law to 
support their adult son.129 The court also pointed out that it was solely 
 
 120 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 452–53. 
 121 Id. at 453. 
 122 Id. at 454. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 455. 
 125 Id. (citing Rubin, 661 F.2d at 991–92). 
 126 Id. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
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speculation that providing for an education would make a difference regarding 
whether the debtors would need to provide financial support to their son in the 
future.130 Under the Wilkinson framework, the court held that the debtors did 
not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the payments made to 
the university.131 
3. Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick): Reasonably Equivalent Value and 
a Familial Obligation to Provide for Education 
Some courts, on the other hand, have opted to protect tuition payments 
from clawback. In Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), the court recognized a 
familial obligation to pay for higher education and based its decision on this 
obligation rather than an analysis of reasonably equivalent value.132 In this 
case, the chapter 7 trustee brought an action against the husband and wife 
debtors for both actual and constructive fraudulent transfers.133 The husband 
debtor was a former partner at a law firm.134 The law firm was sued by the 
landlord from which it rented office space for breaching the lease 
agreement.135 Approximately twenty partners, including the debtor, were also 
named as defendants.136 Six years later, a judgment was entered in favor of the 
landlord against the debtor, and certain other defendants, in the amount of $2.7 
million.137 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment.138 The 
landlord then filed a fraudulent transfer action against the couple in an attempt 
to collect on the judgment.139 Less than a year later, the couple filed for 
bankruptcy.140  
When the couple filed for bankruptcy, the trustee filed an adversary 
proceeding against them to avoid a variety of transfers made by the couple 
after the lease violation suit began, including $82,536.22 worth of payments 
made to the University of Chicago and Robert Morris University for the 
college education of two of their children.141 The trustee argued that the 
debtors have no legal obligation under Pennsylvania law to pay for the 
education of their children once they have reached eighteen years of age or 
graduated from high school, whichever comes later.142 The trustee asserted 
“that ‘enhanced’ education is not a necessity” and that expenditures for non-
necessities were recoverable.143 
In response, the debtors argued that the tuition payments were necessary 
for two reasons.144 First, the debtors argued that “college tuition and related 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 460. 
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educational expenses for the children [is] a family obligation.”145 Second, the 
debtors explained that their children were denied student aid by both state and 
federal governments because of their ‘expected family contribution.’146 
The court held that the college tuition expenses were “reasonable and 
necessary for the maintenance of the Debtor’s family,” but restricted this 
finding to § 548 by indicating the decision was “for purposes of the fraudulent 
transfer statute only.”147 The court said: 
Even though there may not strictly speaking be a legal obligation for 
parents to assist in financing their children’s undergraduate college 
education . . . this Court has little hesitation in recognizing that there 
is something of a societal expectation that parents will assist with 
such expense if they are able to do so.148 
The court also explained that there was no evidence the debtors had made the 
educational expenditures “as part of a strategy or with an ulterior motive to 
shield the funds from the reach of [the landlord].”149 
4. DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino): Financially 
Independent Children as Reasonably Equivalent Value 
Finally, in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), the 
court held that the debtors did receive reasonably equivalent value, in the form 
of a financially independent child, for the college tuition they paid.150 The 
debtors were convicted on felony charges for operating a Ponzi scheme and 
 
 132 In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712. 
 133 Id. at 694. 
 134 Id. at 693. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 694. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 699. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 711. 
 142 Id.; see In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27. 
 143 In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 711–12. 
 147 Id. at 712. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16. 
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filed joint petitions for relief under chapter 7.151 In the two years preceding 
their conviction and subsequent bankruptcy filing, the debtors paid a total of 
$64,696.22 to Sacred Heart University to cover tuition and other educational 
expenses for their daughter.152  
The chapter 7 trustee acknowledged that the university had no knowledge 
of the debtors’ fraudulent activity and received their payments in good faith. 
However, he argued that these transfers were constructively fraudulent because 
the debtors did not “receive reasonably equivalent value from [the university] 
in exchange for the payments and [they] were insolvent at the time the 
payments were made.”153  
The court highlighted that this case turned on a question of value. It 
acknowledged “[t]here is no dispute that but for the question of value, the 
debtors’ payments would qualify as constructively fraudulent.”154 The transfers 
met the other requirements under § 548: “[t]he funds transferred belonged to 
the [debtors], the transfers were made within the two and four year statutory 
lookback periods under the Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA, and the [debtors] 
were insolvent when the transfers were made.”155 The court also accepted a 
previous bankruptcy court’s finding that “[e]thereal or emotional rewards, such 
as love and affection, do not qualify as value for purposes of defeating a 
constructive fraudulent conveyance claim”156 and that under Massachusetts 
law, there is no legal obligation for a parent to support an adult child.157  
Still, the court determined the trustee’s valuation of the debtors’ payments 
to the university was “overly rigid.”158 It found “that the [debtors] paid [the 
university] because they believed that a financially self-sufficient daughter 
offered them an economic benefit and that a college degree would directly 
contribute to financial self-sufficiency.”159 Based on this, the court held that 
the debtors had received reasonably equivalent value from the university and 
therefore, the payments did not constitute constructive fraud.160  
Despite being the more recent of these four decisions, the Oberdick and 
Palladino courts did not settle the issue. Courts since Palladino have reached 
the same conclusion as the Lindsay and Leonard courts: that parental 
 
 151 Id. at 12–13. 
 152 Id. at 12. 
 153 Id. at 13. 
 154 Id. at 15. 
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contributions to higher education are not protected from clawback in 
bankruptcy.161 Legislative action could put an end to the unpredictable results 
from the courts. 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Section will first argue that parents paying for their children’s college 
education do not receive reasonably equivalent value as defined above. It will 
then assess several policy arguments in favor of an exception for payments to 
institutions of higher education from a trustee’s avoidance powers despite the 
lack of reasonably equivalent value received in return. Next, the Protecting All 
College Tuition Act of 2015, an act proposed to protect such payments from 
clawback by trustees, will be introduced. Discussion of the Act will focus on 
how it is incomplete and will not prevent trustees from attempting to clawback 
tuition payments because it fails to pre-empt state fraudulent transfer laws. 
Therefore, this Section will argue that the PACT Act is not a viable solution to 
the uncertainty surrounding this issue. Finally, this Section will argue in favor 
of protecting these tuition payments where certain criteria are met through 
amendments to the Code similar to those made by the Religious Liberty and 
Charitable Donation Act. Specifically, this Section will argue that trustees 
should not be permitted to avoid payments to institutions of higher education 
for the education of a debtor’s child when either: (1) the payments constitute 
fifteen percent or less of the debtor’s income, or (2) the debtor can demonstrate 
a pattern of making such payments or a history of saving for their children’s 
education. 
A. Parents Do Not Receive Reasonably Equivalent Value in Exchange for 
Tuition Payments 
Despite the conflicting holdings of bankruptcy courts, applying the concept 
of reasonably equivalent value to tuition payments made by a parent debtor 
yields a clear result. Parents do not receive reasonably equivalent value when 
funding higher education for their children. The economic value derived from 
a college education is received directly by the student and any indirect benefit 
to a parent debtor is neither concrete nor quantifiable.162 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 16. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See, e.g., Roach v. Skidmore Coll. (In re Dunston), 566 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2017). 
 162 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342). 
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Parents often hope to provide more opportunities for their children than 
they had. This is especially true in terms of education. As of 2010, fifty percent 
of America’s current college students had parents who did not attend 
college.163 First-generation college students comprise thirty percent of all 
entering college freshmen.164 So it is not surprising that parents often feel, and 
courts have recognized, a moral obligation to help their children pay for higher 
education.165 For example, in In re Palladino, the mother debtor expressed this 
feeling of responsibility in her affidavit: 
As Nicole’s mother, I feel obligated to pay Nicole’s tuition because I 
am her mother and she shouldn’t have to come out of [Sacred Heart 
University] saddled with thousands of dollars in loans. Assisting 
Nicole with her loans gives her the best chance of graduating from 
[Sacred Heart University]. Upon graduating, Nicole will be in the 
best position to go to graduate school, secure a job and become 
financially self-sufficient by finding her own place to live, paying her 
own bills and paying for her own food.166 
There is also often a societal expectation that parents who are financially 
able will assist with educational expenses.167 In the United States, high-income 
parents are significantly more likely to contribute their income and savings to 
their children’s college education compared to low- and middle-income 
parents.168 Approximately eighty-two percent of high-income parents helped 
their children pay for school with out-of-pocket funds in 2014.169 In the same 
year, only roughly fifty-nine percent of middle-income and forty-three percent 
of low-income parents contributed out-of-pocket funds to help pay for 
school.170  
In past cases, debtors have argued that they receive personal benefits as a 
result of their contributions to their children’s education.171 Some of these 
personal benefits include peace of mind in the future opportunities that will be 
afforded to their children and love and appreciation from their children.172 
Parents may also feel they gain an outward appearance of being a “good” 
parent. However, while these rewards may be very important to the debtors, 
they are not economic benefits and do not hold any value in the eyes of 
creditors.173 Bankruptcy courts have said that abstract, emotional benefits like 
love cannot constitute reasonably equivalent value when rebutting a 
 
 163 Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, nces.ed.gov/ 
fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  
 164 Id. 
 165 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457; see also In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27. 
 166 In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15. 
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constructive fraud claim.174 Further, such consideration is not “concrete” or 
“quantifiable” as is required under the Wilkinson test for a benefit to qualify as 
value in the context of § 548.175 
In addition to these intangible benefits, some debtors have claimed they 
benefit economically from having financially independent children.176 In her 
affidavit, the mother debtor in In re Palladino, claimed such value: 
If Nicole is unable to graduate from [Sacred Heart University], she 
will either move back home with me, or she will obtain her own 
place to live in which case I will have to pay for her housing, bills 
and food costs. Either of these options result [sic] in a financial 
burden on me. The value to my husband and I [sic] in exchange for 
paying the tuition to [Sacred Heart University] is a financially self-
sufficient daughter resulting in an economic break to us.177 
It is generally accepted, as the mother debtor argues, that a college degree 
can be helpful to young adults in achieving employment and, in turn, financial 
independence.178 The court in In re Palladino held that, despite the uncertainty 
involved in paying a bill with the expectation of future benefits, “future 
outcome cannot be the standard for determining whether one receives 
reasonably equivalent value at the time of a payment.”  
The court offered medical procedures and music lessons as examples of 
investments that a parent might make not knowing at the time of payment if 
the expenditure will ultimately be “worth it.”179 The court found that it was 
reasonable to assume that a college education will “enhance the financial well-
being of the child” which will result in an economic benefit to the parents.180 
The economic benefit, in this case, is a financially independent child.181 
 
 167 See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; see also In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15. 
 168 SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
 172 See, e.g., In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458. 
 173 See id. 
 174 In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15 (citing In re Gonzalez, 342 B.R. at 169). 
 175 See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342). 
 176 See, e.g., In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16. 
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This would be a sound conclusion if the parents had a legal obligation from 
which they could be relieved. But parents neither have a legal obligation to 
fund a college education for their children, nor to provide financially for their 
adult children if they do not gain financial independence.182 The lack of 
obligation is clear because when a bankruptcy case arises, the debtor’s adult 
child will not have a valid claim for his living expenses alongside other 
creditors.183 Additionally, if the child is a college student, the university will 
have no claim either.184 As long as a student is eighteen or older, the college or 
university they attend has no legal claim for unpaid tuition against their 
parents, even if the parents have made payments on the student’s behalf in the 
past.185 Paying a child’s college tuition does not satisfy any legal claim against 
or obligation of a parent.186 Parents do not receive reasonably equivalent value 
in return when they contribute financially to the higher education of their 
children because they do not receive any direct benefits and any indirect 
benefits they receive are not economic, concrete, nor quantifiable. 
B. Policy Arguments for Protecting Tuition Payments 
Although debtors do not receive adequate consideration for the 
expenditures they make for their children’s education under the reasonably 
equivalent value standard, there are several compelling policy arguments for 
protecting tuition payments from a trustee’s avoidance powers, at least in part. 
First, the government requires students to submit their parent’s financial 
information for consideration when determining the student’s financial need.187 
The financial circumstances of a student’s parents, specifically the amount the 
government believes they can afford to contribute to their child’s education, 
directly impact the amount of financial aid a student receives.188 Second, when 
the colleges and universities accept payments from parents for the education of 
their children, the schools receive these payments in good faith. These 
institutions are not privy to any financial hardships parents may be facing and 
have limited options for recourse if these funds are revoked by a bankruptcy 
 
 182 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457. 
 183 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457. 
 184 See, e.g., How Do I Pay? How Students Pay for Stanford, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, https://parents. 
stanford.edu/how-do-i-pay/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“While the university acknowledges parents’ and 
guardians’ financial support, payment is the responsibility of the student.”). 
 185 See, e.g., id. 
 186 See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458. 
 187 How is Aid Calculated?, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/next-steps/how-
calculated#efc (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 188 Id. 
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trustee. Finally, as higher education becomes more of a necessity, there is a 
societal expectation that parents will help their children pay for college.189 
1. Expected Family Contribution: Parental Finances Impact Financial Aid 
It seems counterintuitive to limit a student’s financial aid award because it 
is decided his parents can afford to contribute a certain amount to his education 
and then later call these transfers fraudulent if the parents file for bankruptcy. 
In the 2011–2012 academic year, seventy-one percent of undergraduate 
students received some form of financial aid.190 Although financial aid is often 
awarded to college students based on academic merit as well as financial need, 
need-based aid is the primary source of financial aid for the majority of 
undergraduate students.191 Need-based aid is awarded based on a student’s 
financial need, a number calculated by subtracting the student’s Expected 
Family Contribution (EFC) from a school’s cost of attendance.192 EFC is 
calculated based on information reported on a student’s Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), including the taxed and untaxed income, assets, 
and benefits of the student’s family.193 Other factors considered are the size of 
the student’s family and the number of family members that will be enrolled in 
college that year.194 For dependent students, their parents must supply this 
information, and for financial aid purposes, a student can remain dependent 
beyond the age of eighteen.195 The effect of parental finances on a student’s 
financial aid has been raised to bankruptcy courts in previous cases.196  
In In re Palladino, the debtors’ daughter, though considered an adult under 
Massachusetts law, was still a dependent for college financial aid purposes.197 
The debtors were required to provide personal financial information on 
financial aid forms for consideration in determining their daughter’s eligibility 
for aid.198 Ultimately, because she was considered a dependent, the amount of 
aid their daughter received from the university was directly affected by the 
 
 189 See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15. 
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financial contributions her parents were deemed to be able to make.199 This is 
true for all dependent students.200  
In a similar fashion, other debtors have argued that the tuition payments 
they made for their children were necessary expenditures. The debtors in In re 
Oberdick explained that their children were granted minimal financial aid, only 
small unsubsidized loans, because of their EFC.201 In short, colleges and 
universities assume parents will pay the EFC amount when awarding aid, so 
that government-decided number could leave dependent students unable to pay 
for college unless their parents actually contribute that amount.202 
2. Schools Receive Payments in Good Faith 
The concept of an Expected Family Contribution tells us that schools can 
reasonably anticipate receiving payments from a student’s parents.203 Colleges 
and universities accept payments from parents in good faith. Even the trustee 
attempting to recover the tuition payments in In re Palladino, acknowledged 
that the university received payments from the debtors on behalf of their 
daughter in good faith and with no knowledge of potentially fraudulent 
activity.204 Financial support from parents is so common that many colleges 
and universities allow students to grant their parents electronic access to their 
account to easily make payments online.205 Schools do not hold on to excess 
funds; instead they receive payments to cover only the amount uncovered by 
other forms of financial aid and refund any overpayments annually.206 
Considering this, schools would have no reason to suspect that a student 
account was being used to place debtor funds out of the reach of a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
Further, payment of tuition and other fees owed to the school are ultimately 
the student’s responsibility as long as the student is eighteen or older.207 This 
means schools have no legal claim against the parents of a student if tuition is 
 
 199 See id.; see also The EFC Formula, supra note 195. 
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visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
 207 See, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184 (“While the university acknowledges parent’s financial 
support, payment is the responsibility of the student.”). 
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unpaid or clawed back in bankruptcy.208 This is problematic if a student has 
graduated or otherwise left the school.209 Recent college graduates are often 
judgement proof and a school’s only course of action, short of litigation, is to 
withhold a student’s transcripts in hopes the inconvenience encourages 
graduates to pay the outstanding balance, assuming they can even afford to.210 
3. College has Become a Necessity and Parents are Expected to Pay 
Schools have come to expect financial contributions from parents and so 
has society. As higher education becomes more of a necessity, there is a 
societal expectation that parents will help their children pay for college. While 
satisfaction of such a societal obligation does not result in an economic value 
to a debtor, and therefore cannot constitute reasonably equivalent value, it is 
still an important consideration in deciding how tuition payments should be 
treated in bankruptcy. 
Americans place great value on a college education.211 Between 2009 and 
2014, an average of ninety-seven percent of those surveyed by Sallie Mae 
agreed that college is an investment in the future.212 More than eighty percent 
said they believe a college education is more important now than it used to 
be.213 And on average from 2009–2014, over eighty percent still viewed going 
to college as part of the American dream.214 
Not only do families think college is important, they think parents should 
help pay.215 Eighty-six percent of those surveyed expressed a willingness to 
stretch themselves financially to facilitate their children’s higher education.216 
As the court said in In re Oberdick, “there is something of a societal 
expectation that parents will assist with [educational] expense[s] if they are 
able to do so.”217  
 
 208 See SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6; see, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184. 
 209 See, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184. 
 210 See Enrollment Holds, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, https://gap.stanford.edu/handbooks/gap-handbook/ 
chapter-5/subchapter-5/page-5-5-1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
 211 SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 212 Id. at 14. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 15. 
 216 Id. 
 217 In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712. 
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C. Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015: Legislation Aimed at 
Protecting Tuition Payments 
In 2015, probably influenced by these policy considerations, federal law 
makers introduced the PACT Act in the House of Representatives.218 The bill 
proposes an amendment to the Code “to provide an exception to the avoidance 
of transactions by bankruptcy trustees under § 548.”219 Specifically, it seeks to 
make good-faith payments by parents of postsecondary education tuition for 
their children an exception to the transfers that may be avoided under § 548.220 
The bill is short and straightforward.221 If passed, it would amend § 548 by 
adding a new subsection.222 This addition would provide an exception to 
§ 548(a)(1)(B), the subsection that lays out the requirement of reasonably 
equivalent value and other criteria for finding a transfer constructively 
fraudulent.223 Specifically, the amendment would read: “(f) A payment by a 
parent to an institution of higher education (as defined in either § 101 or 102 of 
the Higher Education Act) for the education of that parent’s child is not a 
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(b).”224 In other words, under the PACT 
Act, parental payments to institutions of higher education cannot be found to 
be constructively fraudulent.225 
The sponsor of the PACT Act, Representative Chris Collins of New York, 
believes that how parents prioritize their bills is a personal choice and this 
might mean paying for a child’s tuition over other debts.226 He argues that 
“[f]amilies all over America . . . are tightening their belts and paying the tuition 
because it is the future for their kids.”227 The bill is co-sponsored by 
Representative Blake Farenthold of Texas, Representative Doug Collins of 
Georgia, and Representative Luke Messer of Indiana.228 It was introduced to 
the House of Representatives on May 12, 2015, and referred to the 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law on June 
1, 2015.229 The bill has since stalled.230 
 
 218 Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See generally id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id.; 11 U.S.C § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 224 Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 225 See id. 
 226 Stech, supra note 1. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 229 Id. 
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It is unclear why there has been a lack of movement on the bill. However, 
it is unlikely it would successfully prevent trustees from avoiding tuition 
payments.231 The simple language of the bill does not address the avoidance 
powers available to trustees under state law.232 Its deficiencies become 
apparent when compared to a similar act, the Religious Liberty and Charitable 
Donations Protection Act (RLCDPA) of 1998. 
1. The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act 
In 1998, Congress passed the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation 
Protection Act (RLCDPA).233 Prior to the Act’s passage, courts allowed 
bankruptcy trustees to clawback donations to religious institutions and other 
charitable organizations made before the donor filed for bankruptcy under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B).234 The RLCDPA added an exception to § 548 for charitable 
donations.235 Specifically, the RLCDPA added subsection (a)(2) to the 
Code.236 This subsection reads as follows: 
(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or 
charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a 
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in any case which— 
(A) the amount of the contribution does not exceed 15 percent of 
the gross annual income of the debtor for the year in which the 
transfer of the contribution is made; or 
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the percentage 
amount of gross annual income specified in subparagraph (A), if 
the transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in 
making charitable contributions.237 
The addition protects these transfers from a trustee’s clawback power 
regardless of whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value in 
 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Stephens, supra note 18, at 62; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 232 Stephens, supra note 18, at 17; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 233 Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548. 
 234 See, e.g., Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 203 B.R. 468, 478 (D. Kan. 1996); 
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886, 897 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), aff’d, 
152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), rev’d, 82 F. 3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 141 F. 3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 235 Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548. 
 236 Id. 
 237 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012); see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548. 
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exchange, but it does not work alone.238 The RLCDPA also amended § 544, 
the state strong-arm provision.239  
2.  State Strong Arm Powers: What the PACT Act Missed 
Section 544(b) of the Code allows trustees to look to state fraudulent 
transfer laws for authority to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers.240 Most states 
have their own fraudulent transfer statutes. For example, in In re Leonard the 
trustee sought to avoid tuition payments under both Code § 548 and 
Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statute, which is virtually identical.241 Because 
“section 548 merely provides an alternative to a state law cause of action,” 
amending § 544 is essential to effectively limiting a trustee’s clawback 
power.242  
The RLCDPA adds an exception to § 544(b) to exclude transfers to 
charitable organizations from any avoidance power available to trustees under 
state law.243 The section now reads: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation 
incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a 
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 
502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of 
this title. 
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transfer of a charitable 
contribution (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(3)) that is not 
covered under section 548(a)(1)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2). 
Any claim by any person to recover a transferred contribution 
described in the preceding sentence under Federal or State law in a 
Federal or State court shall be preempted by the commencement of 
the case.244 
 
 238 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012); see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548. 
 239 Stephens, supra note 18, at 17; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548. 
 240 Monsour, supra note 44. 
 241 In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 459; 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012); Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(a)(1) 
(2016). 
 242 Stephens, supra note 18. 
 243 Id. at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-183, § 3. 
 244 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2012). 
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The proposed PACT legislation, as described above, would only amend 
§ 548.245 The PACT Act does not include any amendment to § 544.246 Thus, 
trustees could still attempt to clawback tuition payments under individual state 
law.247 Because of this, the PACT Act would not be an effective solution to 
settling the disagreement on treatment of tuition payments in bankruptcy. 
D. An Exception to Section 548 for Tuition Payments 
The drafters of the PACT Act recognized that judicial interpretation has yet 
to yield a consensus on whether payments by parents to colleges and 
universities on behalf of their children should be reachable by trustees under 
§ 548 of the Code.248 Under accepted interpretations of reasonably equivalent 
value, payments made by a debtor to fund higher education for the debtor’s 
child could be found to be constructively fraudulent.249 But policy arguments 
offer significant support for protecting such payments from clawback by 
trustees. Legislative action is necessary to settle the uncertainty. 
This is not the first time § 548 and policy considerations have been in 
conflict. RLCDPA addressed a similar situation involving charitable donations 
for which debtors likely do not receive reasonably equivalent value, but that 
public policy supports protecting.250 Congress should act again to resolve the 
legal divide over educational expenditures in bankruptcy. An exception for 
educational expenditures similar to the one created by RLCDPA for charitable 
donations would embrace the policy considerations discussed above while still 
adequately protecting creditors from attempts by debtors to defraud them.  
1. Comparing Educational Expenditures to Charitable Contributions 
Contributions to a child’s secondary education have similarities to 
charitable donations. Millions of Americans make financial contributions to 
religious and charitable organizations each year.251 Americans gave over $350 
billion to charitable organizations in 2014.252 Similarly, millions of Americans 
 
 245 Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 246 Stephens, supra note 18, at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 247 Stephens, supra note 18, at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267. 
 248 Compare In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, and In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444, with Shearer v. 
In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687, and In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10. 
 249 See Baliban, supra note 50. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 250 See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. See 
generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
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contribute to the higher education of their children each year.253 In 2014, over 
20 million students attended American colleges and universities.254 In the same 
year, fifty-nine percent of American students funding higher education used 
some amount of parent income and savings to pay for college.255 In other 
words, in 2014, over 10 million students relied on parental contributions, at 
least in part, to help pay for college.256 In fact, thirty percent of all college 
costs were covered by parent income and savings.257 These financial 
contributions to charitable organizations and higher education both receive 
favorable social and legal treatment.258 
Within many religions, giving financially to one’s religious institution is an 
important part of long-standing tradition. For example, speaking to Congress 
on behalf of RLCDPA, Representative Ron Packard explained that for many 
Christians tithing is “a sacred commandment, and they cannot practice their 
religions unless they can obey this commandment that says they need to bring 
their tithes to [God].”259 Similarly, and probably a reflection of the increasing 
value placed on higher education, courts in more recent cases addressing the 
treatment of tuition payments in bankruptcy have acknowledged a societal 
expectation that parents contribute financially to the higher education of their 
children.260 The courts recognizing this expectation are the same courts that 
have ruled in favor of protecting such tuition payments from a trustee’s 
clawback power.261 Many Christians believe donating to their church coincides 
with being a good Christian and many parents believe contributing to their 
children’s education coincides with being a good parent. 
 
 251 Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-
resources/charitable-giving-statistics (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  
 252 Id. 
 253 SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6; Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, supra note 163.  
 254 Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, supra note 163. 
 255 SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 20. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 6. 
 258 See, e.g., Charitable Contribution Deductions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/charitable-contribution-deductions (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); 
Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-
benefits-for-education-information-center (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); 529 Plans: Questions and Answers, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/529-plans-questions-and-answers (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016). 
 259 144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4001 (1998) (statement of Rep. Packard). 
 260 See, e.g., In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15; see also SALLIE MAE, 
supra note 1. 
 261 See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16. 
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The government has also demonstrated support for both charitable 
donations and contributions to education through preferential tax treatment. 
Charitable donations have been receiving advantageous tax treatment since 
long before RLCDPA was enacted. The charitable income tax deduction has 
been available to taxpayers since the War Revenue Act of 1917.262 Today, 
taxpayers can deduct charitable contributions of money or property to qualified 
organizations.263 Deductions of up to fifty percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted 
gross income are available in most circumstances.264 
Parents helping their children pay for college can also claim tax benefits 
for their contributions.265 Taxpayers can deduct qualified education expenses 
paid during the year for a dependent student under the Tuition and Fees 
Deduction.266 Qualified education expenses include tuition and fees, room and 
board, books, supplies and equipment, and other necessary expenses such as 
transportation.267 The Tuition and Fees Deduction can reduce a parent’s 
taxable income by up to $4,000.268  
While in most scenarios this maximum deduction is far less than the twenty 
to fifty percent of income deductible under the Charitable Contribution 
Deduction, it is not the only tax benefit available to parents helping their 
children pay for college. Parents saving for their children’s education can 
contribute to 529 plans.269 Operated by state or educational institutions, 529 
plans are designed to offer tax and other incentives to make saving for the 
higher education of a child or other designated beneficiary easier.270 
Contributions to a 529 plan are not tax deductible, but the earnings and 
distributions are exempt from federal, and usually state, taxation when used to 
cover qualified education expenses.271 These tax benefits make clear the 
government’s support of both charitable giving and investing in higher 
education. 
 
 262 See War Revenue Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 700, 40 Stat. 300 (1917). 
 263 Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 258.  
 264 Id. 
 265 Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, supra note 258; 529 Plans: Questions and Answers, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/529-plans-questions-and-answers (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016). 
 266 Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, supra note 258. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 529 Plans: Questions and Answers, supra note 265. A 529 plan is a specialized college-savings plan 
for children. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
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Many of the policy arguments made as sponsors encouraged Congress to 
adopt RLCDPA are notably similar to ones that can be made in support of a 
similar exception for tuition payments.272 For example, Representative George 
Gekas urged Congress that the Code should treat voluntary donations 
differently than other types of transfers because “[t]he inherent nature of 
charitable contributions is that they are made specifically without the intent of 
receiving anything in return.”273 The same can be said about tuition payments 
made by parents to secure the benefit of an education for their child. While the 
contribution might make them feel good and might earn them appreciation 
from the beneficiary, just as a charitable donation would, the benefits of their 
expenditure fall to someone else and are intended to from the outset.  
Representative Gekas also highlighted the nature of the organizations that 
receive charitable donations.274 “Religious and charitable organizations,” he 
said, “provide valuable services to society and serve the common good.”275 
Universities, both public and private, also make important contributions to 
society. In addition to providing higher education, universities contribute 
greatly to research in science, engineering, and other fields.276 They also 
sponsor programs designed to assist military veterans in their transition back to 
civilian life and engage students in community partnerships to better their 
communities in the areas of arts, education, health, housing, and more.277 
Universities are often an important cornerstone in the communities they call 
home. The similarities between contributions to charitable organizations and 
payments to institutions of higher education support extending similar 
protections to these two types of transfers. 
2. Proposed Amendments to Protect Tuition Payments 
Legislation similar to RLCDPA should be introduced to protect tuition 
payments from a trustee’s clawback power. The RLCDPA protects payments 
to charitable organizations in two ways: (1) by protecting transfers up to fifteen 
percent of a debtor’s income, and (2) by protecting transfers over the fifteen 
 
 272 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4000 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas). 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Highest Research & Development Funding, BEST COLLEGES, http://www.bestcolleges.com/features/ 
colleges-with-highest-research-and-development-expenditures/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
 277 See, e.g., Community Partnerships, BROWN U., https://www.brown.edu/academics/college/special-
programs/public-service/community-partnerships (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); Our Programs & Services, 
SYRACUSE U. INST. FOR VETERANS AND MIL. FAM., https://ivmf.syracuse.edu/our-programs/ (last visited Mar. 
3, 2017). 
MACDONALD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:07 PM 
274 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
percent limit where they are “consistent with the practices of the debtor in 
making charitable contributions.”278 
First, RLCDPA protects transfers up to fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross 
income with the intention of “shift[ing] the burden of proof and limit[ing] 
litigation to where there is evidence of change in pattern large enough to 
establish fraudulent intent.”279 A similar “safe harbor” should apply to 
contributions to education and would effectively reduce the amount of 
litigation around the subject. 
Fifteen percent of income is a reasonable limitation on educational 
expenditures by parents. On average, education spending by low-, middle-, and 
high-income parents in 2014 was below this threshold.280 In 2014, middle-
income parents with an income between $35,000 and $100,000, contributed 
$4,877 on average towards college for their children.281 This equates to less 
than fourteen percent of income for any amount of income in that range.282 In 
the same year, high-income parents with an income of $100,000 or more 
contributed $13,540 on average to their children’s education.283 This number 
equates to thirteen and a half percent or less of their income.284 Low-income 
parents, with incomes of $35,000 or less, spent an average of $3,826 on their 
children’s higher education in 2014.285 This amount falls under eleven percent 
of income at an income of $35,000 and only crosses the fifteen percent 
threshold where a parent’s income falls below $25,507.286 It is unlikely that 
parents with an income of $25,507 or less are spending the $3,826 average on 
education because their Expected Family Contribution (EFC), if any, is 
minimal.287 In fact, dependent students automatically qualify for an EFC of 
zero if their parents’ income is $25,000 or less.288 
Creating an exception for educational expenditures that equal fifteen 
percent or less of debtor income would mean that spending in line with average 
parental contributions to education would not be subject to scrutiny under 
 
 278 Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
 279 144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4000 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas). See generally Religious Liberty and 
Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
 280 SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 20. 
 281 Id. at 12. 
 282 Id. at 20. 
 283 Id.  
 284 Id.  
 285 Id.  
 286 Id. 
 287 See The EFC Formula, supra note 195. 
 288 See id. 
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§ 548.289 In turn, this would greatly decrease the number of disputes arising 
over the issue and stop the growing trend of litigation on the matter.290  
Second, RLCDPA protects transfers over the fifteen percent limit when 
they are “consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable 
contributions.”291 Similar language should be drafted for educational 
expenditures. If parents spend more than fifteen percent of their income on 
tuition and related fees, but can demonstrate a consistent practice of doing so, 
such payments should also be protected. Establishing a consistent practice 
should involve looking to college expenditures made for those of the debtor’s 
children currently and previously in college and could also consider the 
balance of college savings accounts when a debtor’s first or only child has not 
been in school long enough to establish a pattern. Of course, whether a debtor 
can establish such a consistent practice might still be a matter to be litigated, 
but the guideline will further advance the policy considerations that favor 
protecting educational spending. 
Looking to RLCDPA is a helpful starting point in drafting legislation to 
create a tuition exception. However, even though it can be used to demonstrate 
deficiencies in the proposed PACT Act, RLCDPA is not without its own 
issues.292 RLCDPA was enacted only 262 days after its proposal.293  
Probably as a result of being passed so hastily, several “drafting glitches” 
have been identified in the Act.294 First, it is unclear from the language of 
RLCDPA whether the value of an individual contribution or the cumulative 
value of all of a debtor’s annual contributions in a year cannot exceed fifteen 
percent of the debtor’s gross annual income.295 Second, RLCDPA does not 
specify what portion of a transfer is recoverable by the trustee should 
contributions exceed fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross annual income.296 
Some courts have said the entire transfer becomes recoverable if it surpasses 
the fifteen percent threshold, while others have held that only the amount 
 
 289 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 290 See generally Stech, supra note 1.  
 291 Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
 292 Stephens, supra note 18, at 16. See generally Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection 
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
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Protection Act of 1998: Amend § 548(A)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 159, 162 
(2008). 
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 295 Id; see Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
 296 See, e.g., Murray v. La. State Univ. Found. (In re Zodhi), 234 B.R. 371, 374 (M.D. La. 1999); see 
also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. 
MACDONALD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:07 PM 
276 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
above fifteen percent can be clawedback.297 These ambiguities make 
application of RLCDPA difficult. 
In legislation protecting payments to colleges and universities, the fifteen 
percent threshold should apply to the total of a debtor’s educational 
expenditures in a given year. Otherwise, as argued in interpreting RLCDPA, a 
debtor could give all of his assets away in increments of less than fifteen 
percent.298 Further, if a transfer exceeds fifteen percent of a debtor’s income 
and is determined to be constructively fraudulent, then the entire transfer 
should be recoverable. The additional exception, where there is evidence of a 
consistent practice of educational spending, would provide added protection 
for debtors that spend more than fifteen percent. Despite this, if it is still 
decided fraud exists, the entire transfer should be considered fraudulent.  
An effective amendment should ensure the term “tuition” or other term 
used to describe the type of expenditures protected is defined to encompass all 
payments to universities to cover tuition and fees, as well as room and board, 
books, supplies and equipment, and other necessary expenses.299 Finally, 
successful legislation will include the amendment to § 544, like the one 
included in RLCDPA, that the PACT Act is missing.300 An express exception 
to the state strong arm provision is necessary to ensure educational 
expenditures are also protected from avoidance powers under state law. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the rising costs of higher education, financial support from parents 
has become increasingly important to students. It is important to protect these 
contributions from attempts by court appointed bankruptcy trustees to claw 
them back. Trustees may argue that these funds should be used to satisfy the 
debtor’s own growing debts, but policy arguments support that parents should 
be able to help their children pay for college. The impact of parental income on 
student financial aid awards, good faith receipt of payments by schools and 
their limited options for recourse, as well as a societal expectation that parents 
help pay for college, support protection of educational expenditures in 
bankruptcy. 
 
 297 See, e.g., Murray, 234 B.R. at 373; see also Reicher, supra note 293, at 172. 
 298 Reicher, supra note 293, at 164. 
 299 See generally Tax Benefits for Education, supra note 258. 
 300 See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3.  
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Though the PACT Act seeks to create an all-encompassing exception for 
tuition payments from trustee avoidance powers, it falls short of a 
comprehensive solution. Looking to RLCDPA for guidance, the Code should 
be amended to protect payments by parents to colleges and universities where 
such payments total less than fifteen percent of a debtor’s gross income in a 
given year, or, if exceeding fifteen percent, the debtor can demonstrate a 
consistent pattern of such educational spending.  
Effective amendments should address the short-comings of the PACT Act 
by ensuring that payments are protected from trustee avoidance powers under 
both federal and state law by amending § 548 as well as § 544. They should 
also make clear that the fifteen percent limitation applies to a debtor’s total 
educational expenditures in a year and indicate that the total amount of a 
transfer is recoverable where a transfer is found to be fraudulent. Amending 
§ 544 and § 548 of the Code in this way to protect payments by parents for the 
higher education of their children would serve the public interest while still 
protecting creditors from fraud. 
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